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INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 2020, former President Donald Trump issued the
first of a series of eight Executive Proclamations suspending immigration
using the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) as a justification.1 These
proclamations have included bans on people traveling from China, Iran, the
Schengen area, the United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil, as well
as refugees, family members of lawful permanent residents, and business
workers. Under the guise of public health and welfare, former President
Trump deployed these orders to further his anti-immigrant agenda and
promote his rhetoric of blaming immigrants for the economic downturn
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
From the start, President Trump did not hide his disdain for
immigrants, particularly those from non-white ethnic groups. He began his
campaign for president by blaming immigration from Mexico for the
economic woes of the United States, saying “When Mexico sends its
people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not
sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re
bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing

* Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of
Law. I am grateful to Frank Rudy Cooper, Eve Hanan, and Addie Rolnick for their helpful
comments. I am also grateful to the Asian American Bar Association of New York for
access and use of their script for the reenactment of Chy Lung v. Freeman.
1. See generally Exec. Order No. 13903, 85 Fed. Reg. 6721 (2020).
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crime. They’re rapists.”2 Throughout the campaign, he continually referred
to immigration from Mexico as security threats, saying “El Chapo and the
Mexican drug cartels use the border unimpeded like it was a vacuum
cleaner, sucking drugs and death right into the U.S.”3 and “[y]ou look at
countries like Mexico, where they’re killing us on the border, absolutely
destroying us on the border. They’re destroying us in terms of economic
development.”4
Indeed, one of his first acts after taking office was to issue
Executive Order 13767 which directed the government to construct a wall
along the southern border between the United States and Mexico.5 This was
immediately followed by Executive Order 13768, which halted federal
funding to any cities and counties that refused to cooperate with federal
immigration enforcement.6 Not long after, in May 2018, the Trump
administration instituted its “zero tolerance” policy against unauthorized
immigrants arriving from Mexico which led to the controversial family
separations of children from their families.7 These anti-immigrant policies,
however, faced fierce criticism and were challenged in the courts with
mixed results. Though district courts enjoined the president from
appropriating funds for his border wall construction, a divided Supreme
Court issued a stay of that order.8 A federal district court issued an
injunction blocking the enforcement of Executive Order 13768,9 and
another federal district court granted a preliminary injunction to halt the
practice of family separation and order the immediate reunification of
separated children with their parents.10
President Trump, however, had most success in restricting
immigration through use of Section 212(f) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act. Section 212(f), which appears as Section 1182(f) in the
United States Code, provides that “[w]henever the President finds that the
entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation,
2. Time Staff, Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech, TIME
(Jun. 16, 2015), https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/ [https://
perma.cc/CCC2-U9VR].
3. Paola Scerdote, The Mexican Cartel Identity: TThe [sic] effects of the
representation of the Mexican community in the U.S., CUNY, https://cuny.manifold
app.org/read/cartel/section/d7128346-ac9f-411e-be74-26c242bd23cb [https://perma.cc/7PF
A-H97M] (last visited Jan. 7, 2022).
4. Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME (Aug.
31, 2016), https://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult [https://perma.cc/
GJ9D-JVNB].
5. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
6. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
7. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136–37 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
8. See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2019).
9. See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1196, 1219 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
10. See L., 310 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–50.
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and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all
aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on
the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.”11 This
was the authority he invoked when he issued Executive Order 13769, also
known as the Muslim Ban, which banned foreign nationals from seven
predominantly Muslim countries from visiting the United States for 90
days, suspended entry to the country of all Syrian refugees indefinitely, and
prohibited any other refugees from coming into the country for 120 days.12
Facing significant challenges in the courts, the Trump
administration amended the Muslim ban with Executive Order 13780
(Muslim Ban 2.0) and Presidential Proclamation 9645 (Muslim Ban 3.0)
which removed refugees from the ban and added North Korea and
Venezuela to the list of banned countries in an attempt to show that the ban
was not exclusively targeting Muslims.13 In Trump v. Hawaii, Justice
Roberts found that in Section 212(f), Congress had delegated broad
authority to the President to exclude aliens so long as he finds that they are
detrimental to the interests of the United States and that the President
fulfilled that textual requirement of Section 212(f) in the case of the Muslim
Ban.14
Following the favorable decision for him in Trump v. Hawaii, the
President continued to invoke 212(f) repeatedly to conduct his vision for
immigration policy during the COVID-19 pandemic. Though initially the
exclusions were country specific based on COVID-19 outbreaks,
distinctions between the restrictions on European countries and Asian and
Middle Eastern countries in respect to trade appeared to exhibit a racial
bias, and eventually the President was emboldened to use COVID-19 as a
justification to more broadly exclude Chinese graduate students and then all
immigrants he deemed to be competition for American workers.15 These
policies were testing the limits of the emergency nature of 212(f) and how
“national interest” is defined under 212(f), since these stances were not new
and were a part of Trump’s immigration platform even before he became
president.16 In fact, his proclamations under 212(f) allowed the president
success where his legislative agenda had previously failed. In the first year
of his presidency, President Trump endorsed the Reforming American
Immigration for Strong Employment (RAISE) Act, which sought to curtail
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1952).
12. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
13. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
14. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408, 2411–12 (2018).
15. See generally Stuart Anderson, Inside Trump’s Immigration Order to Restrict
Chinese Students, FORBES (Jun. 1, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/
06/01/inside-trumps-immigration-order-to-restrict-chinese-students/?sh=19e6073a3bec
[https://perma.cc/458R-4UTD].
16. See generally Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigrati
on-speech.html [https://perma.cc/6S9Z-PF3G].

2022]

RACIAL CONTAGION: ANTI-ASIAN NATIONALISM

489

legal immigration by approximately one half, but it failed to come to a vote
in the Senate, and two similar bills were introduced in subsequent years but
also failed.17 These bills would have had the most significant impact on
Asian immigrants, as the majority of employment-based visas have been
issued to immigrants from Asian countries.18
Throughout the pandemic, President Trump stoked anti-Asian
sentiment, particularly against people of Chinese origin, not by targeting
them as a people group, but constantly blaming China for the pandemic and
calling it the “Chinese virus” and the “China plague.”19 Since the President
began employing anti-Chinese inflammatory rhetoric, there has been an
upsurge in violence against Asian Americans across the nation.20 As Tim
Webster has argued, due to their racialization as perpetually foreign others,
“Asians incite mistrust among the U.S. public, media, and political classes
that is largely disproportionate to the threat they actually pose . . . [and as a]
putative security threat, the rise of Asia is linked to the decline of the
United States.”21 However yet again, this is nothing new, as President
Trump targeted China from the beginning. Trump centered his 2016
presidential campaign on a “Make America Great Again” platform that
fiercely criticized American foreign trade relations, particularly with
China.22 Indeed Trump’s “America First” campaign strategy specifically
attacked foreign competition with China as a chief target. He began his
campaign by complaining how much China was “ripping us,”23 and
continued to lambast China on the campaign trail. Early in his campaign,
he wrote an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, entitled “Ending
China’s Currency Manipulation.”24 China was also a central focus during
his first debate with Hillary Clinton.25 Concerning trade policies with
China, in a campaign rally in Fort Wayne, Indiana on May 2, 2016, Trump
decried, “We can’t continue to allow China to rape our country and that’s
17. See generally RAISE Act, S. 354, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
18. Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Inside the Numbers: How Immigration
Shapes Asian American and Pacific Islander Communities 24, 44 (2019).
19. Vinay Harpalani, Can “Asians” Truly Be Americans?, 27 WASH. & LEE J. C. R. &
SOC. JUST. 559, 565–66 (2021); see also Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Trump Administration: Immigration, Racism, and Covid-19, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 318–19
(2021).
20. Harpalani, supra note 19.
21. Timothy Webster, Why Does the United States Oppose Asian Investment?, 37 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 213, 256–57 (2017).
22. See, e.g., Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech, supra note 16.
23. Time Staff, supra note 2.
24. Donald Trump, Ending China’s Currency Manipulation, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9,
2015),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ending-chinas-currency-manipulation-1447115601
[https://perma.cc/SP5F-9PRU].
25. See generally Hannah Beech, Donald Trump Talked a Lot About China at the
Debate. Here’s What China Thought About That, TIME (Sept. 27, 2016), https://time.com/45
09121/china-presidential-debate-hillary-clinton-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/ZFJ6-QK
WE].
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what they’re doing. It’s the greatest theft in the history of the world.”26
Thus, President Trump’s scapegoating of China to accomplish his
restrictive immigration policies is not simply a result of COVID-19, but is
in line with his entire policy platform from the beginning.
This article situates former President Trump’s use of executive
authority within a larger history of using public health and welfare as a
means of promoting anti-immigrant policies rooted in nationalism and
xenophobia. Trump is not the first, nor will be the last, politician to stoke
nativist and racist anxieties for political gain. Part I examines the move
towards Chinese exclusion in the United States during the late nineteenth
century as a case study of how racist scapegoating of an Asian immigrant
population for domestic economic problems slowly evolved into, and was
legitimized by, legislation centered around public health and safety, and
ultimately national security. Anti-Asian sentiment began as a regional West
coast issue of labor competition, but exploded into a national issue as a
public health and safety concern by connecting the Chinese population to
disease and contagion. This led to the first federal immigration restrictions
in the United States, the Page Act of 1875 that was quickly followed by the
broader Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Chinese exclusion, moreover,
created the foundation for the constitutional theory of plenary power, itself
based on wartime powers of the federal government, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, that became the bedrock for all federal immigration power
thereafter. Part II considers how national security, the rhetoric of war, and
wartime emergency powers of the national government served as
touchstones for continued structural discrimination against Asian American
populations in the United States through the twentieth century and into the
twenty-first century. National security and the need for broad discretionary
powers of the federal government during states of emergency were the legal
justifications for the disparate treatment of ethnic immigrant groups, which
was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States27 and
Trump v. Hawaii.28 Part III analyzes how this expansion of emergency
federal immigration power in the wake of Trump v. Hawaii emboldened
Trump to engage in more expansive exclusions increasingly blurred the
lines between national security, national interest, and baseless xenophobic
scapegoating.
The foundation of immigration law was birthed in xenophobia and
a fear of contagion, which then established the powers of the federal
government based on principles of national security and emergency crisis
control. In fact, the very first federal immigration law instituted specifically
targeted Chinese immigrants by defining them as a security risk to the
26. Veronica Stracqualursi, 10 times Trump attacked China and its trade relations
with the US, ABC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/10-times-trumpattacked-china-trade-relations-us/story?id=46572567 [https://perma.cc/MY3R-A5DS].
27. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944).
28. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018).
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country as carriers of disease even though the true policy reason for their
exclusion was labor competition with white laborers.29 The recent elision of
national economic interests with national security and public health,
therefore, is consistent with historical immigration policy. For this reason,
any reform or reversal of Trump’s use of national security to accomplish his
immigration agenda cannot simply look at the actions of one president, but
must look to the deeper structural roots of the problem that enabled him in
the first place.
I. CONTAGION, YELLOW PERIL, AND EXCLUSION
Anti-Chinese sentiment fueled the first federal immigration laws in
the United States in the nineteenth century. Prior to that time, immigration
to the United States was generally open. A short-lived exception to this
practice were the Alien and Sedition Acts, which were passed during the
Adams administration using fear of impending war with France as an
impetus for their passage.30 The Alien and Sedition Acts were four laws that
were passed in 1798, and included an amendment to the Naturalization Act
of 1790 that extended the period of residency for naturalization from five to
fourteen years; the Alien Enemy Act that conferred upon the President the
power to deport without trial aliens from hostile countries; the Alien
Friends Act that gave the President the same power to deport aliens he
deemed dangerous; and the Sedition Act that made it illegal to “combine or
come together, with the intent to oppose any measure or measures of the
government,” or to write, utter, or publish “any false, scandalous, and
malicious writing or writings” against Congress or the president.31 These
laws, however, were primarily applied towards political enemies of the
Federalist party, especially editors of Democratic-Republican newspapers
who were critical of the Adams administration and sparked debate
concerning First Amendment rights of free speech and free press that
eventually led to the ouster of the Federalist party from power in the
election of 1800.32 After the election, the Alien Friends Act and the
Sedition Act were allowed to expire, and the Naturalization Act was
amended to reduce the residency requirement for naturalization back to five
years instead of fourteen.33 However, the Alien Enemies Act, which had no

29. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HIST., CHINESE IMMIGR. AND THE CHINESE
EXCLUSION
ACTS,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/chinese-immigration
[https://perma.cc/K528-EJEK].
30. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24; see also History.com Editors, Alien and Sedition Acts,
HIST. (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/alien-and-sedition-acts
[https://perma.cc/H2F3-L6XD].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. History.com Editors, supra note 30.
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expiration date, remained but was not applied again until the twentieth
century.34
Chinese immigrants first began arriving in large numbers to the
United States in the middle of the nineteenth century, during this period of
open immigration.35 They were first drawn to California with the discovery
of gold at Sutter’s Mill and settled primarily in Northern California.36 Soon
afterwards, they became an attractive additional workforce for employers
requiring unskilled labor, such as mining, farming, and other physically
demanding work in the region. In particular, the Chinese were heavily
recruited to supply labor for the building of the transcontinental railroad.37
However, since Chinese laborers represented an alternative to the domestic
labor pool that was increasingly becoming organized and unionized,
domestic workers and small farmers viewed them as competition and a
threat to domestic wages.38 Growing resentment against the Chinese among
labor groups eventually spurred a movement to exclude and expel them.
The anti-Chinese movement, at this stage, was almost exclusively regional
to the West coast, and focused on the issue of labor competition.39
White labor interests pressured the California legislature to take
action against the Chinese. Since only free white persons were permitted to
naturalize as citizens, Chinese immigrants were not able to offer any
significant political resistance. Starting in 1850, California began enacting a
series of laws that were hostile to the Chinese, in an effort to discourage
their continued immigration. In 1850 California instituted a Foreign
Miners’ Tax, which imposed a twenty-dollar monthly tax on all foreign
miners who were ineligible for citizenship.40 In 1852, a California
Assembly committee issued a report stating that most Chinese in America
were indentured laborers in the service of foreign capitalists, and that their
presence demeaned American laborers in California.41 In 1855, California
enacted “An Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons
Who Cannot Become Citizens Thereof” which created a Passenger Tax that
imposed a fifty-dollar tax on every person arriving from sea who was
ineligible for citizenship.42 In 1858, the California legislature enacted “An
Act to Prevent the Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. California Gold Rush, BRITANNICA (Nov. 1, 2021, 6:48 PM),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/California-Gold-Rush [https://perma.cc/RW9L-5QX3].
37. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 29.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in Nineteenth
Century American: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV. 529, 536 (1984).
41. Id.
42. An Act to Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons who cannot become
Citizens thereof of Apr. 28, 1855, ch. 153, 1855 Cal. Stat. 194 (officially repealed, Act of
Mar. 30, 1955, ch. 46, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 487, 488).
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State” which made the immigration of Chinese persons punishable by a fine
or imprisonment from three months to a year.43 Then in 1862, the California
legislature enacted “An Act to Protect Free White Labor Against
Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor, and to Discourage the
Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California,” which required
that any person “of the Mongolian race” pay a tax of $2.50 per month,
which was called the “Chinese Police Tax.”44
These discriminatory laws, however, were struck down one by one
by the courts, which defined the limitations of state legislation to regulate
Chinese immigration. In People v. Downer, the California Supreme Court
struck down the 1855 Passenger Tax because it encroached upon federal
commerce power.45 California legislators attempted to defend the law by
stating that the purpose of the Passenger Tax, which was to discourage the
Chinese from immigrating into the state, was a proper exercise of state
police power.46 The court, however, disagreed. Citing the Passenger Cases,
where the Supreme Court struck down New York and Massachusetts laws
imposing head taxes on foreign passengers, the California Supreme Court,
in Downer, found that the tax posed an undue burden on shipping
companies, and therefore interfered with commerce, which was a power
reserved for the federal government.47
The California Supreme Court similarly struck down the Chinese
Police Tax in Lin Sing v. Washburn.48 By basing the tax on racial
background rather than immigration status, the act authorizing the Chinese
Police Tax was written in a way as to avoid implications with federal
commerce.49 Nonetheless, the court found that California’s discriminatory
treatment of the Chinese, by targeting a nationality of people, could damage
foreign relations with China and thus have national ramifications on foreign
commerce and trade.50 Justice Cope, writing for the majority, particularly
noted that “the act before us is a measure of special and extreme hostility to
the Chinese, and that the power asserted in its passage is the right of the
State to prescribe the terms upon which they shall be permitted to reside in
it.51 This right, if carried to the extent to which it may be carried if the
power exists, may be so used as to cut off all intercourse between them and
the people of the State, and obstruct and block up the channels of
43. An Act to Prevent Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this State of
Apr. 26, 1858, ch. 529, 1858 Cal. Stat. 296 (repealed 1955).
44. An Act to Protect Free White Labor Against Competition with Chinese Coolie
Labor, and to Discourage the Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California of Apr.
26, 1862, ch. 339, 1862 Cal. Stat. 462 (repealed 1939).
45. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 171 (Cal. 1857).
46. Id. at 170.
47. Id. at 171.
48. Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 585–86 (Cal. 1862).
49. Id. at 534.
50. Id. at 564.
51. Id. at 577.
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commerce, laying an embargo upon trade, and defeating the commercial
policy of the nation.”52 The Lin Sing opinion also noted that the California
Supreme Court had struck down the 1858 “Act to Prevent the Further
Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this State” in an unpublished
opinion.53
In this respect, the courts were signaling that the ability to promote
or cease immigration of Chinese was an issue of foreign relations and
commerce that was exclusively under the power of the federal government.
If Chinese immigration was going to be curbed, it would take federal action
to do so. However, the stance of the federal government on the Chinese
appeared to be moving in the opposite direction as California. Indeed, in the
years following the Lin Sing decision, the federal government was pursuing
increased trade and commerce with China, which culminated with the
granting of most favored nation status to China with the signing of the
Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868.54 Though the Chinese immigrants
themselves lacked the political power to resist the passage of discriminatory
laws in California, the federal government’s interest in international trade
relations with China would curb this tide, at least temporarily. For the
California interest of Chinese exclusion to be accomplished, not only would
the Chinese problem need to be expanded to a federal issue, but that issue
would need to trump the federal government’s interest in maintaining good
foreign relations with China.
Anti-Chinese agitators on the West coast would soon have their
chance on the national stage. The completion of the transcontinental
railroad in 1869 suddenly flooded the labor market with thousands of
unskilled Chinese workers. Since California alone could not possibly
accommodate the sudden glut of unemployed Chinese workers, they began
moving to other states. Indeed, the following year, an incident in
Massachusetts ignited anti-Chinese sentiment in the East Coast, making the
question of Chinese exclusion into a national issue. In June 1870, Calvin
Sampson, the owner of a shoe factory in North Adams, Massachusetts,
brought in seventy-five Chinese laborers as scab workers during a labor
dispute with the Knights of St. Crispin Union.55 Immediately afterwards, at
its annual meeting in August 1870, the National Labor Union adopted an
anti-Chinese stance, thereby drawing national attention to an issue that was
originally localized to the West coast.56 National legislation seeking to limit
Chinese immigration, however, stalled for several years, indicating that the
labor issue was not enough to garner the support needed in Congress.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 534.
54. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HIST., THE BURLINGAME-SEWARD TREATY,
1868, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/burlingame-seward-treaty [https://perm
a.cc/3PBV-FSKL].
55. Henry S. Cohn & Harvey Gee, “No, No, No, No!”: Three Sons of Connecticut
Who Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 34 (2003).
56. Id.
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Several anti-Chinese bills were introduced in Congress from 1873 to 1875,
mostly by Representative Horace Page of California. All of them failed,
however, due again to the competing interest of the other legislators
desiring to maintain healthy trade relations with China.57
The unifying interest that finally facilitated Chinese exclusion at
the federal level was public health and morality. In Lin Sing, the court did
signal that the police power of states permitted them “to exclude obnoxious
persons, such as paupers and fugitives from justice,”58 but reasoned that the
discriminatory taxing of the Chinese was not an exercise of such power.59
Thus, California began shifting the rhetoric of exclusion towards framing
the Chinese as “obnoxious persons” who posed a threat to public health and
morality and would therefore be subject to regulation under state police
power. To achieve this, the legislature began targeting Chinese brothels. In
March 1866, the California legislature passed “An Act for the Suppression
of Chinese Houses of Ill Fame.”60 In March 1870, the legislature passed
“An Act to Prevent the Kidnapping and Importation of Mongolian, Chinese
and Japanese Females, for Criminal or Demoralizing Purposes.”61 Under
this Act, if a passenger of a vessel was an Asian female, she was required to
present evidence that she was immigrating voluntarily and that she was a
“good person of correct habits and good character.” If she was unable to do
so, the captain of the vessel carrying her could be charged with a
misdemeanor punishable by a $1,000 to $5,000 fine or two to twelve
months imprisonment.62 During the 1873-74 legislative session, this Act
was merged into Section 2952 of Chapter 1, Article 7, of the Political Code
of California, and added lewd or debauched women as additional
classifications of individuals to whom monetary bonds could be attached
prior to disembarkation.63
This law came under challenge in what has come to be known as
the case of the 22 Lewd Women.64 On August 24, 1984, the steamship
Japan landed in San Francisco carrying approximately 600 passengers from
Hong Kong, eighty-nine of whom were women.65 As authorized under the
California Political Code, the California Commissioner of Immigration
boarded the Japan and interviewed the eighty-nine women to ascertain
whether any of them were prostitutes.66 After the interviews, he determined
that twenty-two of the eighty-nine women were “debauched women” under
57. See generally Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 690–91 (2005).
58. Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 578 (Cal. 1862).
59. Id. at 578–80.
60. Abrams, supra note 57, at 677.
61. Id. at 674.
62. Id. at 675–76.
63. Id. at 677.
64. See Chy v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1876).
65. In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 214 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
66. Id.
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the statute and ordered that the women would not be allowed to disembark
unless $500 bonds were posted on their behalf.67 Neither the captain nor the
owner of the vessel was willing to pay, and thus the women were ordered to
be detained pending departure of the vessel.68 The twenty-two women
applied for a writ of habeas corpus with the California District Court, which
ruled against them.69 The court came to the factual conclusion that the
women were indeed lewd and that their exclusion was a legitimate exercise
of police power to preserve the “well-being and safety” of the state of
California.70 The women appealed to the Supreme Court, which issued its
decision a week later in Ex parte Ah Fook.71 Whereas previously the
California Supreme Court had struck down discriminatory legislation
targeting the Chinese as infringing upon federal power over commerce and
foreign relations, this time the court agreed with the finding of the district
court that the exclusion of Chinese prostitutes was a valid exercise of police
power. With its police power, which the Court calls also the “power of selfprotection,”72 the state possesses broad discretion to exclude elements
deemed threatening to public safety and public health. The California
Supreme Court found the exclusion of prostitutes to be:
[O]f the same nature as the power which isolates those ill
of contagious diseases, or those who have been in contact
with such, or the power to prohibit the introduction of
criminals or paupers. These powers are employed, not to
punish for offenses committed without our borders, but to
prevent the entrance of elements dangerous to the health
and moral well-being of the community.73
Finally, the women appealed to the federal circuit court. In his
decision in In re Ah Fong, Justice Stephen Field, riding circuit in San
Francisco, found that the statute was an overly broad exercise of state
police power and that it still trespassed on the federal power over commerce
and foreign relations.74 As a result, the twenty-two women were ordered
freed. However, Justice Field left open the possibility of federal action on
the issue, saying “if further immigration is to be stopped, recourse must be
had to the federal government, where the whole power over this subject
lies.”75 Though California’s effort to exclude the Chinese by casting them
as “obnoxious persons” that fall under state police power ultimately failed,
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Chy, 92 U.S. at 276.
Id.
In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 214, 218.
Abrams, supra note 57, at 684–85.
49 Cal. 402, 403 (1874).
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406–07.
In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 218.
Id. at 217.
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it nonetheless created a space to shift and expand the rhetoric of exclusion
from labor to public health and safety.
As the crucial midterm election of 1874 neared, the “Chinese
problem” began gathering bipartisan support. Though the Democrats were
more unapologetically xenophobic in their intentions to protect white labor
interests, the Republicans were more moderate in their stance. President
Grant, in his annual address to the nation in 1874, signaled the need to
frame the Chinese problem as a moral issue rather than a labor issue,
saying:
[T]he great proportion of the Chinese immigrants who
come to our shores do not come voluntarily, to make their
homes with us and their labor productive of general
prosperity, but come under contracts with head-men, who
own them almost absolutely. In a worse form does this
apply to Chinese women. Hardly a perceptible percentage
of them perform any honorable labor, but they are brought
for shameful purposes, to the disgrace of the communities
where settled and to the great demoralization of the youth
of these localities.76
Taking the cue of the President, anti-Chinese members of Congress
narrowed the scope of national exclusionary proposals to prostitutes. In his
opening speech introducing the Page Act,77 Representative Horace Page
focused on the public health crisis that Chinese prostitutes posed to the
general population. The judiciary, in In re Ah Fong, had indicated that it
would require federal legislative action to curb the threat of Chinese
contagion from prostitutes. Representative Page, in his introduction of the
Page Act, included a letter from the Commissioner of Immigration, stating
“[i]t is well known that every city and town in this State has Chinese
brothels in such numbers as to spread disease to the young and
inexperienced of our population.”78 The Page Act was passed with
overwhelming support, was signed by President Grant, and effectively
barred immigration of women from China unless they could prove that they
were not prostitutes.79
Even after the Page Act, the subject of inquiry continued to be on
disease and contagion. During an inquiry about Chinese immigration in
1876 before the California State Senate, a good portion of the medical
76. 3 Cong. Rec. 3–4 (1874).
77. Page Act of 1875, Pub. L. No. 43-141, § 1, 18 Stat. 477 (1875).
78. Abrams, supra note 57, at 693.
79. See 3 Cong. Rec. 1599, 2161 (1875); see also Ulysses S. Grant, Chinese
Immigration, and the Page Act of 1875, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/articles/
000/ulysses-s-grant-chinese-immigration-and-the-page-act-of-1875.htm [https://perma.cc/DJ
48-S6VL].
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testimony centered around a concern of transmission of syphilis from the
Chinese to the white population.80 However, whereas the focus of the
debate prior to the passage of the Page Act was on women, the attention
now turned to the entire Chinese population that was dominated by men. As
historian Nayan Shah states:
Since syphilis infection was imagined as emblematic of the
Chinese race, its transmission was not restricted to sexual
contact with Chinese women. Chinese men, in their
capacity as domestic servants, were just as liable to infect
white families. Since women represented a tiny proportion
of the Chinese population and lived physically restricted in
Chinatown, the threat Chinese men could pose in
disseminating disease was far more ominous.81
Also in 1876, during a hearing before the United States Senate on the issue
of Chinese immigration, medical testimony cited leprosy as another
condition that was widespread in the Chinese population and would rise to
epidemic proportions in the United States if Chinese immigration were
allowed to continue.82
Representative Albert Shelby Willis, a Democrat from Kentucky,
opened the debate on Chinese Exclusion in the House of Representatives by
citing his own change of heart about the Chinese and arguing that exclusion
had become a bipartisan issue.83 He directly linked the Chinese threat to
American labor to the “squalid” living conditions of the foreign aliens, and
described how:
Crowded, huddled together, forty or fifty in a room not
larger than would accommodate with decency and comfort
one man with a family, discarding or disregarding all the
usual ordinary appliances of personal civilization as to diet
and clothing' cooking, eating, and sleeping in the same
apartment, they have succeeded in reducing the cost of
living to a minimum, and thus wherever located have
forced the laboring classes to the wall.84
Later in the debate, Willis likened the Chinese to a pestilence,
stating:

80. See generally NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES: EPIDEMICS
FRANCISCO’S CHINATOWN 85–90 (2001).
81. Id. at 89.
82. Id. at 99.
83. 13 Cong. Rec. 1976 (1882).
84. Id.
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They are parasites, like those insects which fasten
themselves upon vegetables or upon animals and feed and
feed until satiety causes them to release their hold. They
come to this country not to partake in the responsibilities of
citizenship; they come here with no love for our
institutions; they do not hold intercourse with the people of
the United States except for gain; they do not homologate
in any degree with them. On the contrary, they are parasites
when they come, parasites while they are here, and
parasites when they go.85
Representative George Cassidy, another Democrat from Nevada, echoed
Willis’ characterization, saying that the Chinese brought with them drugs
and disease.86
The issue of Chinese Exclusion came under judicial review in Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Case.87 In
1888, Congress passed the Scott Act, which renewed the Chinese Exclusion
Act and amended it to additionally forbid the reentry of Chinese immigrants
even if they had previously been present in the United States.88 Chae Chan
Ping was a Chinese immigrant who had initially come to the United States
in 1875, but had left on June 2, 1887 to temporarily visit China.89 At the
time, the law permitted him to return to the United States if he obtained a
certificate of reentry, which he did.90 However, while he was away, and in
fact during his return trip to the United States, Congress passed the Scott
Act, which rendered Ping’s certificate of reentry void.91 When Ping landed
in the port of San Francisco, he was denied reentry by the collector of the
port and ordered to remain detained on the steamship on which he had
arrived.92 Ping filed a writ of habeas corpus protesting his detention,
claiming that the Scott Act was a contravention of the Burlingame Treaty.93
An earlier case, Chy Lung v. Freeman, had set the precedent of
immigration control being in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government as a matter of international trade and foreign relations.94 Chy
Lung v. Freeman was an appeal of the earlier state court decisions in the
case of the 22 Lewd Women. In Chy Lung, the Supreme Court ruled that

85. Id. at 3358.
86. Id. at 1980.
87. Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889).
88. Scott Act of 1888, IMMIGR. AND ETHNIC HIST. SOC’Y, https://immigration
history.org/item/scott-act/ [https://perma.cc/SRS8-RD7R].
89. Ping, 130 U.S. at 582.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Chy v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1875).
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immigration restriction was a power reserved for the federal government.95
Though the Chinese women had already been ordered released in Ah Fong,
they nonetheless brought a writ of error to the Supreme Court to reverse the
rulings of the California state courts in order to test the constitutionality of
the California statute. The Supreme Court overturned the California statute,
finding that immigration control was a feature of foreign relations and
foreign commerce, which was exclusively in the jurisdiction of the federal
government.96
However, in Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court expanded federal
immigration power beyond just the issues of commerce and diplomacy, and
enshrined federal immigration control as an integral feature of national
sovereignty and national security.97 Though the power to limit immigration
was not enumerated in the Constitution, the court reasoned that it was
inherent in the issue of national sovereignty; the court asserted,
“[j]urisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every
independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude
aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power.”98
The court identified the power to exclude aliens among the same powers of
sovereign nations “to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection,
repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments
to the states, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship.”99
Immigration control was a matter of national security, and the court stated:
To preserve its independence, and give security against
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of
every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other
considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what
form such aggression and encroachment come, whether
from the foreign nation acting in its national character, or
from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The
government, possessing the powers which are to be
exercised for protection and security, is clothed with
authority to determine the occasion on which the powers
shall be called forth.100
In the same way that a country is permitted to protect its borders
against foreign invasion, so too was a country broadly permitted to exclude
foreigners that it deemed undesirable and potentially damaging to the
national interest.
95. Id. at 280.
96. Ping, 130 U.S. at 610.
97. Id. at 603–04.
98. Id. at 604.
99. Id. at 606.
100. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).

2022]

RACIAL CONTAGION: ANTI-ASIAN NATIONALISM

501

Thus, the Court found the Chinese Exclusion to be within the
plenary power of Congress over immigration matters. Subsequent cases
would further solidify the plenary power of Congress over immigration. In
United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court appealed
again to the plenary power of Congress over immigration, saying “the
exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so
stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive
power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”101 In Mathews v. Diaz,
where an immigrant challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute that
denied them access to federal Medicare because of their immigrant status,
the Court reemphasized the sweeping breadth of Congress’ plenary power
remarking, “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens.”102
II. KOREMATSU, INTERNMENT, AND THE ENEMY WITHIN
Asians as national security threats would reemerge following the
Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into
World War II. Following the attack, President Franklin Roosevelt invoked
the Enemy Alien Act to issue Executive Order 9066, where he authorized
the Secretary of War and military commanders to exclude individuals they
deemed to be threats to national security, regardless of citizenship, to be
excluded from areas designated as military zones.103 This order led to
evacuation and internment of over 110,000 people of Japanese descent,
70,000 of whom were United States citizens.104 The government justified
this action as a military necessity to curb the threat of espionage and
sabotage that might assist an enemy invasion of the West Coast.105 Like a
virus living within the body, the Japanese posed the threat of an enemy
within that could compromise national security. Of the imagined types of
invasions, American officials feared that Japan might launch biological
weapons containing plague and disease against the West Coast.106
Executive Order 9066 famously came under constitutional
challenge in Hirabayashi v. United States107 and Korematsu v. United

101. Id.
102. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976).
103. Executive Order 9066, February 19, 1942; General Records of the United States
Government, Record Group 11, National Archives.
104. Margaret Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 955, 974–75
(2017).
105. Id.
106. DONALD AVERY, BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS: RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT
AND USE FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO 1945, 190, 211 (Erhard Geissler & John Ellis van
Courtland Moon eds., 1999).
107. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83–84 (1943).
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States.108 In Hirabayashi v. United States, the Supreme Court reasoned that
conditions of national emergency justify exemption from constitutional
protections. Gordon Hirabayashi had been convicted of disobeying an
army curfew order issued only to people of Japanese ancestry living in the
United States pursuant Executive Order 9066.109 Though recognizing that
the curfew targeted him because of his national origin and potentially an
equal protection violation, the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld his
conviction, reasoning:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality. For that reason, legislative classification or
discrimination based on race alone has often been held to
be a denial of equal protection. We may assume that these
considerations would be controlling here were it not for the
fact that the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of
war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military
authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the
loyalty of populations in the danger areas.110
Desperate times demanded desperate measures, even if it meant suspension
of constitutional protections.
Eighteen months later, the Supreme Court would rule on a
challenge to another army order issued pursuant to Executive Order 9066,
this time ordering the exclusion of people of Japanese ancestry from their
homes in order to relocate them to the internment camps.111 Fred
Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, defied the exclusion
order and remained in his home in San Leandro, California and was
convicted of violating the order.112 Korematsu appealed his conviction,
asserting that the exclusion order targeted him because of his race and was
therefore a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.113 In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny but found, as in Hirabayashi, that the military necessity
arising from the danger of espionage and sabotage justified the
discriminatory exclusion order.114
The same day as Korematsu was decided, the Supreme Court ruled
that relocation of people of Japanese ancestry to the internment camps was
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944).
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83–84.
Id. at 100.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 215–16, 218.
Id. at 216.
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invalid in Ex parte Endo.115 However, the Court ordered her release not on
equal protection grounds, because she was being unlawfully targeted
because of her national origin, but because the Court found that relocation
was beyond the scope of what Executive Order 9066 authorized.116 Thus,
Endo leaves in place the validity of Executive Order 9066 and the
emergency powers of the president to suspend constitutional protections in
times of emergency as dictated in Hirabayashi and Korematsu.
In his concurrence in Oyama v. California, Justice Murphy, who
previously had openly denounced the majority decision in Korematsu as
racist, recounted the long history of discriminatory laws aimed at
discouraging Asian immigration, noting in particular how similar strategies
were deployed to target the Japanese in the same manner as the Chinese.117
The Japanese, like the Chinese, were viewed as competition to white labor,
and specifically in the agricultural sector. The Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians concluded that an important
motivator for interment was economic competition, finding “[i]n part the
hostility was economic, emerging in various white American groups who
began to feel competition, particularly in agriculture, the principal
occupation of the immigrants.”118 As noted by Justice Murphy and Justice
Roberts in their concurrences, the Court deftly avoids the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional questions of equal protection and due process by
only focusing on the scope of permissible actions authorized under
Executive Order 9066, rather than the validity of Executive Order 9066
itself.119
Though the motivation was economic, the discourse of exclusion
and discrimination was couched in the discourse of public health and safety.
In his Oyama concurrence, Justice Murphy notes how the language of
contagion and squalid living conditions renewed public health and safety
justifications for restrictions on Asians, saying:
The Japanese were depicted as degenerate mongrels and
the voters were urged to save ‘California—the White Man's
Paradise’ from the ‘yellow peril,’ which had somewhat
lapsed in the public mind since 1913. Claims were made
that the birth rate of the Japanese was so high that the white
people would eventually be replaced and dire warnings
were made that the low standard of living of the Japanese

115. Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 283 (1944).
116. Id. at 299.
117. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 651–52 (1948).
118. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT
OF CIVILIANS 4 (1983).
119. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 651–52.
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endangered the economic and social health of the
community.120
Though the discourse of public welfare and national emergency were the
justifiers, the motivation for Japanese internment was xenophobic racism
caused by labor competition.
Korematsu instituted a principle of almost unrestricted judicial
deference to executive decisions made under the auspices of national
security and national emergency. In the wake of the September 11 attacks
on the World Trade Center, public sentiment and public policy quickly
turned to racial and religious scapegoating of immigrants from Muslim and
Middle Eastern countries.121 Amidst public fears of further terrorist attacks,
Congress quickly passed the USA Patriot Act which significantly expanded
the national security powers of the executive branch.122 Immigration and
Naturalization Services was disbanded and reorganized as a subsection of
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. In Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, Yaser Hamdi, a United States citizen, challenged his designation
as an enemy combatant which therefore allowed for his indefinite
detention.123 The Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi’s favor, but only insofar as
he was entitled to a low-level hearing to determine whether he was an
enemy combatant, which was a low bar for the government to justify
continued indefinite detention.124 Justice Souter, concurring with the
judgment but dissenting in part, noted:
The plurality does, however, accept the Government's
position that if Hamdi's designation as an enemy combatant
is correct, his detention (at least as to some period) is
authorized by an Act of Congress as required by § 4001(a),
that is, by the Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115
Stat. 224 (hereinafter Force Resolution). Ante, at 2639–
2642. Here, I disagree and respectfully dissent.125
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court upheld
an overbroad statute that made it a crime to provide material support to a
foreign terrorist organization.126 Though the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny, it deferred to a single conclusory affidavit proffered by the
government to justify the statute. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
120. Id.
121. Marium Fam et al., Two decades after 9/11, Muslim Americans still fighting bias,
AP NEWS, Sept. 7, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/September-11-Muslim-Americans-93f97
dd9219c25371428f4268a2b33b4 [https://perma.cc/V7QD-6TPB].
122. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
123. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510–11 (2004).
124. Id. at 508.
125. Id. at 541.
126. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 1–2 (2010).
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noted “[t]he Government, when seeking to prevent imminent harms in the
context of international affairs and national security, is not required to
conclusively link all the pieces in the puzzle before we grant weight to its
empirical conclusions.”127
The judicial deference to national security decisions of the
executive branch resurfaced again in Trump v. Hawaii, which challenged
the Muslim Ban.128 When President Trump instituted the Muslim Ban, he
himself made comparisons to Executive Order 9066 and Japanese
internment, saying “Roosevelt did the same thing.”129 Applying 212(f) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, President Trump declared that
immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries posed a security risk to
the nation and therefore would be excluded from entry into the United
States.130 In Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Roberts again granted great deference
to the office of the President, saying “[w]hile we of course ‘do not defer to
the Government’s reading of the First Amendment,’ the Executive’s
evaluation of the underlying facts is entitled to appropriate weight,
particularly in the context of litigation involving ‘sensitive and weighty
interests of national security and foreign affairs.’”131
Section 212(f) was intended to be an emergency power. In
Abourezk v. Reagan,132 then Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the
D.C. Circuit found the Congressional delegation of discretion to be
extensive, remarking:
[E]ven if the court were to find that subsection (27) cannot
be applied to bar aliens whose mere entry would threaten
United States foreign policy interests, the Executive would
not be helpless in the face of such a threat. He may act
pursuant to section 1182(f) to suspend or restrict “the entry
of any aliens or any class of aliens” whose presence here he
finds “would be detrimental to the best interests of the
United States.” The President's sweeping proclamation
power thus provides a safeguard against the danger posed
by any particular case or class of cases that is not covered
by one of the categories in section 1182(a).133
In times of imminent threat, according to Ginsburg, the President is
invested with authority to act swiftly on behalf of the national interest.
However, problems arise when the same executive who is given expansive
127. Id. at 35.
128. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 2408 (2018).
129. Engy Abdelkader et al., The Muslim Ban Revisited: Trump v. Hawaii Two Years
Later, 44 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 248, 249 (2020).
130. Id.
131. Trump, 138 S.Ct. at 2422 (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 33–34).
132. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
133. Id. at 1063.
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powers in times of national emergency is also given the power to define
what constitutes an emergency.
III. THE CHINESE VIRUS AND THE COVID-19 TRAVEL BANS
Possibly emboldened by the deference given to him by the Supreme
Court in Trump v. Hawaii, President Trump continued to use 212(f) as a
means of creating new immigration exclusions. On October 4, 2019, he
issued Proclamation 9945, also known as the Health Care Ban, which
barred entry for immigrants who were unable to demonstrate that they
would be covered under health insurance within thirty days of entry or that
they have the financial resources to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical
expenses.134
With the COVID-19 reaching global epidemic proportions at the
start of 2020, President Trump issued a series of travel restrictions citing
COVID-19 as a justification. Throughout the pandemic, President Trump
evoked the discourse of national security, calling the virus the “invisible
enemy” and saying that the country was engaged in a “war.”135 At the same
time, he repeatedly employed racially hostile language when referring to
COVID-19, calling it the “Wuhan virus,” the “Chinese virus,” the “China
plague,” and the “kung flu.”136 By doing so, President Trump was engaging
in racial scapegoating.
Several of these bans were country specific. On January 31, 2020
President Trump issued Proclamation 9984, which suspended and limited
entry for immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens who were present in China
during the fourteen days immediately preceding their attempted entry to the
United States.137 Following an outbreak of COVID-19 in Iran, President
Trump issued Proclamation 9992 on January 29, 2020, similarly suspending
entry for immigrants and nonimmigrants who had been present in Iran
during the fourteen days immediately preceding their attempted entry to the
United States.138 Due to COVID-19 outbreaks across Europe, on March 11,
2020, the President issued Proclamation 9933 which restricted entry for
immigrants and nonimmigrants who had been present in the “Schengen
Area” during the fourteen days immediately preceding their attempted entry
to the United States.139 The Schengen Area is comprised of Austria,
134. Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991 (Oct. 4, 2019).
135. Libby Cathy, Trump now calling coronavirus fight a ‘war’ with ‘invisible enemy’,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-coronavirus-task-forceeconomic-public-health-steps/story?id=69646672 [https://perma.cc/7XVT-3RCJ].
136. Colby Itkowitz, Trump Again Uses Racially Insensitive Term To Describe
Coronavirus, WASH. POST (June 23, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumpagain-uses-kung-flu-to-describe-coronavirus/2020/06/23/0ab5a8d8-b5a9-11ea-aca5-ebb63d2
7e1ff_story.html [https://perma.cc/E3HP-9FN6].
137. Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,709 (Jan. 31, 2020).
138. Proclamation No. 9992, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,855 (Feb. 29, 2020).
139. Proclamation No. 9993, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,045 (Mar. 11, 2020).
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Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.140 However, in Proclamation
9993, President Trump made a special note that he was continuing to allow
the free flow of commerce between the United States and the Schengen
Area, stating “[t]he free flow of commerce between the United States and
the Schengen Area countries remains an economic priority for the United
States, and I remain committed to facilitating trade between our nations.”141
On March 20, 2020, President Trump issued Proclamation 9996, restricting
travel for immigrants and nonimmigrants present in the United Kingdom
during the fourteen days immediately preceding their attempted entry to the
United States.142 Like Proclamation 9993, Proclamation 9996 also
permitted the continued flow of commerce from the United Kingdom and
the Republic of Ireland to the United States. When President Trump added
Brazil to the list of nations from which travel immigrant and nonimmigrant
aliens would be barred entry to the United States with Proclamations 10041
and 10042 on May 24, 2020 and May 25, 2020,143 he made the same
notation about continuing trade relations. The notation about trade,
however, did not appear in the earlier bans from China and Iran.
The differences in the trade exemptions were colored by President
Trump’s foreign policy decisions. In an action consistent with his campaign
stances on China, President Trump began a trade war with China in 2018.144
As a preface to imposing tariffs or quotas on imports, President Trump has
repeatedly called foreign imports a national security threat.145 President
Trump called the trade war with China an emergency, saying “I could
declare a national emergency, I think when they steal and take out and
intellectual property theft anywhere from $300 billion to $500 billion a year
and when we have a total lost [sic] of almost a trillion dollars a year for

140. Eur. Comm’n, The Schengen visa, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/
policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/visa-policy/schengen-visa_en [https://perma.cc/2GAA-X
566] (last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
141. Proclamation No. 9993, supra note 139, at 15,046.
142. Proclamation No. 9996, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,341 (Mar. 14, 2020).
143. Proclamation No. 10041, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,933 (May 24, 2020); Proclamation No.
10042, 85 Fed. Reg. 32,291 (May 25, 2020).
144. Ryan Hass & Adrian Denmark, More pain than gain: How the US-China trade
war hurt America, BROOKINGS (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2020/08/07/more-pain-than-gain-how-the-us-china-trade-war-hurt-america/ [https://pe
rma.cc/7RL3-MU3Q].
145. Geoffrey Gertz, Did Trump’s tariffs benefit American workers and national
security?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 10, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/
did-trumps-tariffs-benefit-american-workers-and-national-security/ [https://perma.cc/JU2SVLLJ].

508

BELMONT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9: 2

many years.”146 Similarly, during his presidential campaign, Trump
severely criticized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more
commonly referred to as the Iran Nuclear Deal, which the United States and
Iran negotiated in 2015.147 By doing so, it allowed the United States to
reimpose economic sanctions on Iran. In this respect, the differences in the
trade provisions in the COVID-19 bans furthers Trump’s antagonistic trade
policies with China and Iran.
More troubling, however, are the Executive Orders invoking 212(f)
during the pandemic that departed from the region-specific COVID-19 bans
and expanded the scope of presidential discretion in determining what
qualified as “emergency national interest” that permitted the use of 212(f).
Starting with Proclamation 10014, issued on April 22, 2020, President
Trump used 212(f) to create a series of broad exclusions citing the effect of
COVID-19 on the economy.148 Proclamation 10014 prohibited entry of
foreign aliens coming into the United States for work purposes for a period
of sixty days. On June 22, 2020, in Proclamation 10052, President Trump
claimed that the initial sixty-day exclusion of immigrant and nonimmigrant
work visas had proved insufficient to protect American labor interests, and
that there was still too much competition from foreign workers, and so he
was extending the duration of Proclamation 10014 for an additional six
months until December 31, 2020.149 The proclamation also contained a
provision allowing for its continued extension as necessary.150 In fact, on
December 31, 2020, President Trump issued Proclamation 10131 that
extended Proclamations 10014 and 10052 until March 31, 2021.151 Had
Trump not lost the 2020 election, it is likely that he would have extended
this exclusion indefinitely.
On May 29, 2020, President Trump issued Proclamation 10043.152
Citing misappropriations of United States technologies and intellectual
property by China, the proclamation restricted the entry of graduate
students and postdoctoral researchers from China.153 However, what is
disturbing is that even though the Trump administration had been targeting
China for the exact same reasons ever since the start of the

146. Amanda Macias, Trump on US-China trade war: ‘I could declare a national
emergency’, CNBC (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/25/trump-on-us-chinatrade-war-i-could-declare-a-national-emergency.html [https://perma.cc/B886-83PX].
147. See Colum Lynch, Despite U.S. Sanctions, Iran Expands Its Nuclear Stockpile,
FP, (May 8, 2020, 2:21 PM) https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/08/iran-advances-nuclearprogram-withdrawal-jcpoa/ [https://perma.cc/RSS6-B6EZ].
148. Proclamation No. 10014, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,441 (Apr. 27, 2020).
149. Proclamation No. 10052, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,263 (June 22, 2020).
150. Id.
151. Proclamation No. 10131, 86 Fed. Reg. 417 (Dec. 31, 2020).
152. Proclamation No. 10043, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,353 (May 29, 2020).
153. Id.
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administration,154 President Trump used his emergency powers 212(f) in the
midst of anti-Chinese sentiment during the COVID-19 pandemic to finally
execute that policy. Like Executive Order 9066, Proclamation 10043 was
issued without any evidence. In a study sponsored by the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory, political scientist Rory Truex finds
that there is “insufficient evidence that academic/economic espionage by
Chinese nationals is a widespread problem at US universities.”155 Like
Executive Order 9066, Proclamation 10043 capitalized on racialized
mistrust of Asians living in the United States, associating them with a
foreign threat purely by virtue of their ethnic background.
This occurred previously in the case of Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a
naturalized United States citizen who worked at Los Alamos Nuclear
Laboratory, and who was arrested and charged with selling information
about the United States nuclear program to the Chinese government.156 Dr.
Lee was accused of espionage, put in solitary confinement for 278 days,
and indicted on 59 counts of mishandling government information.157 Dr.
Lee was absolved of all counts except one count of mishandling computer
files, which he pled guilty to.158 Dr. Lee was released with time served.159
During the acceptance of his plea, Judge James Parker, the federal judge
overseeing his criminal case, apologized, saying “I believe you were
terribly wronged by being held in custody pretrial in the Santa Fe County
Detention Center under demeaning, unnecessarily punitive conditions. I am
truly sorry that I was led by our executive branch of government to order
your detention last December.”160 Dr. Lee subsequently sued the United
States government for violating his privacy, and obtained a settlement of
$1.6 million.161 Though he was a United States citizen and not even born in
China, but in Taiwan, he was presumed to have loyalties to China simply
because of his ethnicity.162 There are other cases, such as Dr. Xiaoxing Xi, a
Temple University physicist who was accused of sending trade secrets to

154. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GEN. JEFF SESSIONS’S CHINA INITIATIVE FACT
SHEET (2018) (“Chinese economic espionage against the United States has been increasing-and it has been increasing rapidly. Enough is enough. We're not going to take it anymore.”).
155. Rory Truex, Addressing the China Challenge for American Universities, JOHNS
HOPKINS APPLIED PHYSICS LAB’Y (2020), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1116897.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WV8-U6HH].
156. United States v. Lee, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1281–82 (D.N.M. 1999).
157. Id. at 1282.
158. WEN HO LEE & HELEN ZIA, MY COUNTRY VERSUS ME: THE FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT
BY THE LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIST WHO WAS FALSELY ACCUSED OF BEING A SPY 2 (2001).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Margaret K. Lewis, Criminalizing China, 111 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 145,
192 (2021).
162. Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen
Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2000).
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China,163 but the charges were later dropped. Similarly, Sherry Chen, a
hydrologist working for the National Weather Service, was accused of
sending government data to a former colleague in China, but all charges
against her were also dropped.164 Proclamation 10043 continues this trend
of targeting scholars of Chinese descent for economic espionage with scant
proof other than their ethnic background.
Furthermore, Proclamation 10043 illustrates the problem with
investing the President's broad discretion to define the national interest,
since the exclusion of Chinese students and researchers will likely be
harmful to the national interest. Since Chinese students make up a large
percentage of the graduate student population in the United States,165 their
exclusion will likely be more costly to the United States. Stuart Anderson,
the executive director of the National Foundation for American Policy, a
non-partisan public policy research organization focusing on trade and
immigration, forecasts that:
Every 1,000 Ph.D.’s blocked in a year from U.S.
universities costs an estimated $210 billion in the expected
value of patents produced at universities over 10 years and
nearly $1 billion in lost tuition over a decade, according to
an analysis from the National Foundation for American
Policy. That does not include other economic costs, such as
the loss of highly productive scientists and engineers
prevented from working in the U.S. economy or patents
and innovations produced outside university settings.166
CONCLUSION
In his dissent in Korematsu, Justice Jackson called the exclusion
order a “legalization of racism,” and warned that “[t]he principle then lies
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
163. See United States. v. Xi, No. 16-22-5, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128757 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 1, 2018) (denying a motion to dismiss the charges referenced); Matt Apuzzo, After
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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/us/after-missteps-us-tightens-rules-for-national-securit
y-cases.html [https://perma.cc/LCX3-FURR].
164. See Andrew Chongseh Kim, Prosecuting Chinese “Spies”: An Empirical Analysis
of the Economic Espionage Act, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 761 (2018).
165. See Jacob Feldgoise & Remco Zwetsloot, Estimating the Number of Chinese
STEM Students in the United States, CSET (Oct. 2020), https://cset.georgetown.edu/
publication/estimating-the-number-of-chinese-stem-students-in-the-united-states/ [https://per
ma.cc/94LM-WYAK] (reporting Chinese nationals comprise sixteen percent of all graduate
STEM students).
166. Stuart Anderson, Biden Keeps Costly Trump Visa Policy Denying Chinese Grad
Students, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2021, 12:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/
2021/08/10/biden-keeps-costly-trump-visa-policy-denying-chinese-grad-students/?sh=743c5
bb23641[https://perma.cc/BU4W-6M7P].
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bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”167 In the past, racial
animus has been easily guised in the form of national interest and imminent
threat to the nation. Whereas racial animus and labor competition alone
were not enough to justify the exclusion of the Chinese, public health and
safety eventually carried the day in effecting their exclusion at the federal
level. Similarly, though not a single person of Japanese ancestry was ever
convicted of any serious crime of sabotage or espionage, national security
and safety were deployed in the midst of World War II to dispossess
thousands of Japanese Americans of their property and erase their
competitive position in the farming industry on the West Coast.
Justice Roberts attempted to repudiate Korematsu in Trump v.
Hawaii with the statement, “Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—‘has
no place in law under the Constitution.’”168 However, the deference that
Trump v. Hawaii confers on the office of the President to determine
national interest and emergency situations elides that distinction. Though
couched within the exigent circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic at
the close of his presidency, President Trump’s use of presidential
proclamations under 212(f) were thinly veiled attempts at accomplishing a
restrictive immigration agenda he had touted even before the beginning of
his presidency. Whereas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, national
exigency was used as a facade to engage in racial animus, the COVID-19
bans illustrate how a president can easily frame racial animus as the exigent
circumstance that justifies discrimination.
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